John Keslay on the Concept of Islamic War
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ziasudraIslam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics
John Kelsay, Louisville, Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.
"From the standpoint of comparative religious ethics, it is important to consider the relationship between the Islamic view of peace and predominant Western views. A number of the most significant issues have to do with the place of war in the quest for peace." (p. 40)
1. What constitutes a just cause for war? (religion, extending geographic boundary, defensive)
2. jus in bello thought: "How seriously do the opposing sides attempt to honor (a) the principle that the among of force used must be proportionate to the goal sought; and (b) the requirement that noncombatants must never be the target to direct military action?" (p. 41)
3. "In view of the requirement that wars be authorized by a competent authority, how can irregulars be said to fight a just war?" (p. 42)
Chapter 3: Religion as a Cause of War: Resort to War in the Islamic Tradition, pp. 43-55.
Goal: "In this chapter, I shall focus on issues connected with the last two lines of the quotation: 'The army is Go's army and the enemy is God's enemy. The duty of God's soldiers is to dispatch God's enemies as quickly as possible to the place where God will chastise them—that is to say, the afterlife.'" (p. 44)
Thesis: "I shall argue the following case: The Islamic tradition, in both classical and contemporary manifestations, suggests that, contrary to Lewis's depiction, the idea of religion as a casus belli provides a way to limit the occasion and the damage of war." (p. 44)
~ Holy war ≠ total war; just war ≠ limited war.
Kelsay mentions prior scholarship of Roland Bainton: "Bainton argued that just war thinking emerged as a kind of antidote to wars of religion; that one of the identifying characteristics of the just war tradition is its limitation of just cause to secular motivations such as the defense of national boundaries, and that this secularization of war led to more humane conceptions concerning the ways war ought to be conducted." (pp. 43-44)
~ Kelsay disagrees with Bainton's definition of just war as a "more humane" way to conduct war. In fact, he plans to argue the opposite in this essay. He has previously refuted Bainton's just war theory in another work, Just War and Jihad.
On Qur'anic recognition of the necessity of war (divinely sanctioned):
"Thus in one sense pacifism, in the sense of a thoroughgoing rejection of war, was not an option for Muslim thinkers. That did not mean, however, that such thinkers accepted war as the normal condition of humanity. Rather, the Qur'an and the example of Muhammad gave them a means by which to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force." (p. 46)
dar al-islam: territory of Islam.
jihad: "struggle" to implement the will of God.
harb: wars fought outside of jihad purposes.
"For the Sunni theorists, 'just war' was limited to jihad, that is, to war that could be identified with obedience to God's command to 'command good and forbid evil,' to establish peace and justice on earth." (p. 46)
"But the central fact—that in the case of Sunni thought, religion is conceived as a limit on war—seems to me to be incontrovertible." (p. 47)
~ Kelsay points out that Islamic religious limitation to war is both at the front end (just ad bellum) and the back end (jus in bello).
Shiites:
"...as a minority, often persecuted by the Imperial State, the Shiites were less inclined than the Sunnis to assign the label 'jihad' to wars conducted by the existing authorities." (pp. 47-48)
~ More so than the Sunnis, Shiites believe just war can only happen in the context of a religious war—in the defense of Islamic territory.
Recognizes bias:
"Some contemporary writing on jihad is apologetic, intended to demonstrate to non-Muslims that islam is a religion of peace. But much is a legitimate development of the basic ideas of the Qur'an and of classical Islamic thought." (p. 48)
"The idea that wars should be fought for 'secular' purposes—for example, the defense of a nation-state...—is viewed with some suspicion, as opening the door to indiscriminate resort to and conduct of war." (p. 48)
Example: 1980 Iraq-Iran War
~ Ayatullah Khumayni defined the war as jihad.
~ Saddam Hussein started the war as a "sovereigns' war," eventually changed POV to define it as jihad.
~ Khumayni accused Hussein as secular: "No truly religious or Islamic country would be so aggressive" (p. 49)
~ Khumayni's participation in war is a defense of Islamic territory.
In this case, Kelsay shows that it isn't secular war that is more humane. As defined by Khumayni (however valid that may be), it is secularism that led to a war that wouldn't have happened if both sides stuck to Islamic practices.
"A 'sovereigns' war' is limited in its objectives and its expenditure of the sovereign's military capacity. It need not be limited by considerations of discrimination, except as those serve the political interests of the sovereign." (p. 51)
Iran vs. Iraq:
~ "Iran's apparent shift in the midst of the war has something of the character of a military judgment." (p. 50)
~ "Iraq's war policy seems to have been dictated by a kind of cost-benefit analysis tied to its strategic aims." (p. 50)
Contemporary application: Saddam Hussein's fighting in the Iran-Iraq war was a response to feeling his state threatened by Iran. His invasion of Kuwait (representing himself as an Islamic sovereign) "reflected Saddam Hussein's perception of the perception of the special context that drove his policies, as well as his sense of the threat posed by Allied force to the existence of his regime." (p. 52)
"For many devout Muslims, 'secularism' indicates an orientation that fails to respect religiously sanctioned norms, including those governing resort to and limitation of war." (p. 52)
"On the other hand, Islam serves to limit the occasion and conduct of war in very explicit ways." (p. 53)
~ As in, wars allowed only to extend "Islamic hegemony," with its aim ultimately being the creation of a state in which people can dwell in peace.
Kelsay:
"For my part, I am not particularly interested in drawing such general lessons from this or any other case of thinking about war. What interests me is, first, that some people draw these kinds of lessons and, second, the ways in which that fact serves to reinforce elements of Islamic tradition that focus on religion as a casus belli." (p. 53)
"...the Islamic case seems to further the critique offered by various scholars of the Bainton thesis that notions of religion as a cause of war lend themselves to a crusade mentality, where considerations of discrimination and proportionality pale in the light of a holy cause." (p. 53)
"...where religion is a significant factor in defining political identity, the ways people talk about resort to and limitation of war will frequently involve religious terminology." (p. 53)
Contextualization:
"For a just war theorist, the problem is to get beyond the received notions concerning 'holy war' in order seriously to engage the Islamic tradition and its ways of thinking about resort to and limitation of war." (pp. 53-54)
"For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is simply learning, it is important now to enlarge the scope of that conversation [of moral issues raised by the political use of lethal force] by attending to Islam and to other religious and cultural traditions that heretofore have not been a decisive part of that conversation." (pp. 54-55)
~ Kelsay is transitioning from his micro-history case study of the Iran-Iraq war to a larger scope of just war analysis. His move is justified. In a world (then, when he wrote the book, as well as now) where the notion of jihad is discussed but often not understood, limiting one's study to micro-history would do little good to influence academia or political policy, which require conclusions in a broader context for the sake of flexible application.
Chapter 4, Islam and the Conduct of War: The Question of Jus in Bello Restraints, pp. 57-76.
Thesis: "This chapter begins with the suggestion that the connections between noncombatant immunity and moral principles or theological beliefs are not so clear as some would have us believe." (p. 58)
jus in bello: justice in war
"the developed form of the just war tradition stresses this distinction [noncombatants' immunity from harm] as a part of its concern for justice in war." (p. 57)
~ As "categorical prohibition of murder"? (p. 57)
~ Distinction based of moral reasoning.
~ Theologically: what justifies also limits, since fighting to protect the innocent was what spurred war to begin with.
"The notion of noncombatantcy is one way...of discriminating between the innocent and the guilty in war. It is a socially constructed way of specifying who the innocent are." (p. 58)
Prior scholarship, James Turner Johnson (p. 58):
Just war emphasis on noncombatancy grew out of
1. Canon law tradition of the church—"persons who do not make war...should not have war against them."
2. Medieval chivalry code of the knights—"those having military prowess agree not to exercise their power against others weaker than themselves."
~ Johnson critiques Ransey's just war argument, says it obscures the existing struggle of protecting noncombatants.
"Noncombatant immunity may begin with concerns about the 'categorical prohibition of murder' or the love command. But such concerns only become specific following a long and arduous process involving the interests of religious, political, legal, and military institutions." (p. 59)
"The Islamic tradition on jus in bello restraints, like its Western counterpart, reflects a cultural consensus on the conduct of war: a consensus that owes much to moral principles and theological concerns but is also indebted to political and military factors." (p. 59)
"List of persons with immunity" compiled from various hadiths based on Muhammad's own war experiences (p. 59).
"The phenomenon of devotion to the Prophet Muhammad, and the sense that all Muslim behavior should be systematically, consistently scrutinized in terms of the guidance of God, must be seen as a primary motivation for the development of classical Sunni thinking on war( and on other matters)." (p. 60)
~ This is Kelsay's basis on Sunni thought, though not his only basis.
Presupposed interpretation of the Qur'an:
"A scholar such as al-Shaybani thus presupposed the connection of Islam with an imperial state and its power—specifically, the power of the Abbasid caliphate, by whom he (as others) was appointed as chief qadi or religious judge." (p. 60)
~ So alongside historical and scriptural bases is the interpretative aspect of forming a worldview.
Yet another worldview influence: engagement in military practice.
~ Unlike the other two, this one is a view formed practically and experientially. Which begs the question: which has more authority? The pronouncement of authority, derived theoretically (and historically, since Muhammad's own experience in historical accounts ought not be dismissed), or one's personal experience in matters not explicitly laid out in text or oral traditions?
"Fred Donner has suggested that a number of practices, including notions of who may or may not be killed in war, were adopted into Islam from the pre-Islamic culture of Arabia or from the conquered regions." (p. 60)
Random note: I notice Kelsay always define an Arabic term (XXX, or YYY). What does this say about his audience? The book is definitely academic in genre, but perhaps it's meant for fields other than religious or Islamic study, in which scholars are expected to have a working knowledge of Arabic.
fard kifaya: collective obligation
fard ayn: individual obligation
"And thus the territory of Islam—really, the world—could not be a secure place until and unless Islamic hegemony was acknowledged everywhere. To secure such hegemony was the goal of the jihad, or 'struggle in the path of God.'" (p. 61)
~ This is Kelsay's definition of the term jihad. (Note other scholars' definitions and compare/contrast.)
Ibn Rushd (Averroes) on the damage of an enemy (p. 62):
1. Property
2. Person (life and limb)
3. Liberty
"Ir does not seem to me that the Sunni theorists actually articulate a notion of noncombatant immunity, as just war thinkers understand it." (p. 66)
~ Conclusion drawn after looking into who was immune: men, women, children, Muslim women, Muslim children; battlefield vs. after capture (al-Shaybani's discussion).
In the West:
"...specification in terms of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants—deciding, in a sense, to assign innocence or guilt according to the roles people play." (p. 66)
"Classical Sunni theorists dealt with this question in a different way. For them, guilt and innocence had to do with religious and political factors." (p. 66)
"The rules governing the fighting of rebels thus continue to demonstrate the qualification of moral concerns for discrimination in war by religious, political, and military considerations." (p. 69)
~ Kelsay cites Ali's (the fourth caliph) saying about not killing rebels after the rebellion is over. Treatment is different because people involved in the fighting are different: one is not fighting an unbeliever, but another Muslim who had gone against established authority (within Islamic territory).
Contemporary:
"Unlike the classical theorists, contemporary Muslim thinkers seem mostly interested in the jus ad bellum."
~ Rather than the jus in bellum.
jus ad bellum or jus contra bellum: law on the use of force or law on the prevention of war
Consider this phrase:
"When, in 1924, the 'Young Turks' abolished the Ottoman Caliphate, they did away with one of the most important institutions of classical Islam.... The Turkish abolition of the institution signified the decision of an elite to institute radical reform: in effect, to depart from the classical patterns of Islamic culture and to develop new ways of ordering life." (p. 69)
Kelsay's claim, from his observation of Turkish secularization:
"...Muslims who have been doing the most thinking about the conduct of war have not been doing so as self-conscious developers of the tradition of Islamic thought." (p. 69)
~ His example to back up this claim: the PLO, whose claims are based more on Arab nationalism than on Islamic traditions.
"To struggle against this enemy [Israel, Zionism, world imperialism], by whatever means one can muster, is just. Correspondingly, those who support the enemy or who stand idly by incur guilt and become, in some sense, legitimate targets of military force." (p. 70)
~ So this is a new definition of just war. The concept is still to accomplish one's goal through force, but how, and by what means, are different. This is more a "guilty by association" mentality, more seeing people as blocs regardless of age and participation in war.
"In more Islamic materials, two types of writing have been predominant in modern discussions of jihad: one is apologetic and seeks to indicate to the world that Islam is not a 'religion of the sword.' The other is revolutionary and seeks to indicate the justice of Islamic struggle against imperialism." (p. 71)
~ Group 1: Mahmud Shaltut's The Koran and Fighting, all justified war is defensive; Kelsay finds his reason for jus in bellum lacking. Group 2: "Creed of Sadat's Assassins," Egyptian tract, fighting necessary to pursue Islamic state, no in-betweens; also lacking attention to jus in bellum, attention all towards jus ad bellum.
Consider:
"It is typical of much twentieth-century Islamic thought that it is not involved with considerations of statecraft.... Islamic thought has been either in the position of providing legitimacy...[or] a language of resistance." (p. 74)
"In this interpretation, the shelling [of Basra, Feb., 1984] would symbolize a growing conviction that the Iraqi people must be held responsible for their continued support of Saddam Hussein." (p. 75)
~ Kelsay parallels Iran's action as resembling jus in bello, where mass attack did not happen until after degrees of guilt was separated (mass responsibility for all Iraqis in the end not withstanding).
In accordance with Western just war ideas (p. 76):
~ Just vs. unjust
~ Innocent vs. guilty
~ Different levels of blame (and thus difference treatment)
Specification of justice: religious, political, military. These factors contribute to differences in the development of jus in bello between western and Islamic cultures.
"...students of ethics ought never to underestimate the importance of a real engagement with statecraft, including military strategy, for the formulation of a developed teaching on the conduct of war." (p. 76)
~ Note Kelsay's audience: students of ethics, not necessary Islamic study students.
John Kelsay, Louisville, Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.
"From the standpoint of comparative religious ethics, it is important to consider the relationship between the Islamic view of peace and predominant Western views. A number of the most significant issues have to do with the place of war in the quest for peace." (p. 40)
1. What constitutes a just cause for war? (religion, extending geographic boundary, defensive)
2. jus in bello thought: "How seriously do the opposing sides attempt to honor (a) the principle that the among of force used must be proportionate to the goal sought; and (b) the requirement that noncombatants must never be the target to direct military action?" (p. 41)
3. "In view of the requirement that wars be authorized by a competent authority, how can irregulars be said to fight a just war?" (p. 42)
Chapter 3: Religion as a Cause of War: Resort to War in the Islamic Tradition, pp. 43-55.
Goal: "In this chapter, I shall focus on issues connected with the last two lines of the quotation: 'The army is Go's army and the enemy is God's enemy. The duty of God's soldiers is to dispatch God's enemies as quickly as possible to the place where God will chastise them—that is to say, the afterlife.'" (p. 44)
Thesis: "I shall argue the following case: The Islamic tradition, in both classical and contemporary manifestations, suggests that, contrary to Lewis's depiction, the idea of religion as a casus belli provides a way to limit the occasion and the damage of war." (p. 44)
~ Holy war ≠ total war; just war ≠ limited war.
Kelsay mentions prior scholarship of Roland Bainton: "Bainton argued that just war thinking emerged as a kind of antidote to wars of religion; that one of the identifying characteristics of the just war tradition is its limitation of just cause to secular motivations such as the defense of national boundaries, and that this secularization of war led to more humane conceptions concerning the ways war ought to be conducted." (pp. 43-44)
~ Kelsay disagrees with Bainton's definition of just war as a "more humane" way to conduct war. In fact, he plans to argue the opposite in this essay. He has previously refuted Bainton's just war theory in another work, Just War and Jihad.
On Qur'anic recognition of the necessity of war (divinely sanctioned):
"Thus in one sense pacifism, in the sense of a thoroughgoing rejection of war, was not an option for Muslim thinkers. That did not mean, however, that such thinkers accepted war as the normal condition of humanity. Rather, the Qur'an and the example of Muhammad gave them a means by which to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force." (p. 46)
dar al-islam: territory of Islam.
jihad: "struggle" to implement the will of God.
harb: wars fought outside of jihad purposes.
"For the Sunni theorists, 'just war' was limited to jihad, that is, to war that could be identified with obedience to God's command to 'command good and forbid evil,' to establish peace and justice on earth." (p. 46)
"But the central fact—that in the case of Sunni thought, religion is conceived as a limit on war—seems to me to be incontrovertible." (p. 47)
~ Kelsay points out that Islamic religious limitation to war is both at the front end (just ad bellum) and the back end (jus in bello).
Shiites:
"...as a minority, often persecuted by the Imperial State, the Shiites were less inclined than the Sunnis to assign the label 'jihad' to wars conducted by the existing authorities." (pp. 47-48)
~ More so than the Sunnis, Shiites believe just war can only happen in the context of a religious war—in the defense of Islamic territory.
Recognizes bias:
"Some contemporary writing on jihad is apologetic, intended to demonstrate to non-Muslims that islam is a religion of peace. But much is a legitimate development of the basic ideas of the Qur'an and of classical Islamic thought." (p. 48)
"The idea that wars should be fought for 'secular' purposes—for example, the defense of a nation-state...—is viewed with some suspicion, as opening the door to indiscriminate resort to and conduct of war." (p. 48)
Example: 1980 Iraq-Iran War
~ Ayatullah Khumayni defined the war as jihad.
~ Saddam Hussein started the war as a "sovereigns' war," eventually changed POV to define it as jihad.
~ Khumayni accused Hussein as secular: "No truly religious or Islamic country would be so aggressive" (p. 49)
~ Khumayni's participation in war is a defense of Islamic territory.
In this case, Kelsay shows that it isn't secular war that is more humane. As defined by Khumayni (however valid that may be), it is secularism that led to a war that wouldn't have happened if both sides stuck to Islamic practices.
"A 'sovereigns' war' is limited in its objectives and its expenditure of the sovereign's military capacity. It need not be limited by considerations of discrimination, except as those serve the political interests of the sovereign." (p. 51)
Iran vs. Iraq:
~ "Iran's apparent shift in the midst of the war has something of the character of a military judgment." (p. 50)
~ "Iraq's war policy seems to have been dictated by a kind of cost-benefit analysis tied to its strategic aims." (p. 50)
Contemporary application: Saddam Hussein's fighting in the Iran-Iraq war was a response to feeling his state threatened by Iran. His invasion of Kuwait (representing himself as an Islamic sovereign) "reflected Saddam Hussein's perception of the perception of the special context that drove his policies, as well as his sense of the threat posed by Allied force to the existence of his regime." (p. 52)
"For many devout Muslims, 'secularism' indicates an orientation that fails to respect religiously sanctioned norms, including those governing resort to and limitation of war." (p. 52)
"On the other hand, Islam serves to limit the occasion and conduct of war in very explicit ways." (p. 53)
~ As in, wars allowed only to extend "Islamic hegemony," with its aim ultimately being the creation of a state in which people can dwell in peace.
Kelsay:
"For my part, I am not particularly interested in drawing such general lessons from this or any other case of thinking about war. What interests me is, first, that some people draw these kinds of lessons and, second, the ways in which that fact serves to reinforce elements of Islamic tradition that focus on religion as a casus belli." (p. 53)
"...the Islamic case seems to further the critique offered by various scholars of the Bainton thesis that notions of religion as a cause of war lend themselves to a crusade mentality, where considerations of discrimination and proportionality pale in the light of a holy cause." (p. 53)
"...where religion is a significant factor in defining political identity, the ways people talk about resort to and limitation of war will frequently involve religious terminology." (p. 53)
Contextualization:
"For a just war theorist, the problem is to get beyond the received notions concerning 'holy war' in order seriously to engage the Islamic tradition and its ways of thinking about resort to and limitation of war." (pp. 53-54)
"For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is simply learning, it is important now to enlarge the scope of that conversation [of moral issues raised by the political use of lethal force] by attending to Islam and to other religious and cultural traditions that heretofore have not been a decisive part of that conversation." (pp. 54-55)
~ Kelsay is transitioning from his micro-history case study of the Iran-Iraq war to a larger scope of just war analysis. His move is justified. In a world (then, when he wrote the book, as well as now) where the notion of jihad is discussed but often not understood, limiting one's study to micro-history would do little good to influence academia or political policy, which require conclusions in a broader context for the sake of flexible application.
Chapter 4, Islam and the Conduct of War: The Question of Jus in Bello Restraints, pp. 57-76.
Thesis: "This chapter begins with the suggestion that the connections between noncombatant immunity and moral principles or theological beliefs are not so clear as some would have us believe." (p. 58)
jus in bello: justice in war
"the developed form of the just war tradition stresses this distinction [noncombatants' immunity from harm] as a part of its concern for justice in war." (p. 57)
~ As "categorical prohibition of murder"? (p. 57)
~ Distinction based of moral reasoning.
~ Theologically: what justifies also limits, since fighting to protect the innocent was what spurred war to begin with.
"The notion of noncombatantcy is one way...of discriminating between the innocent and the guilty in war. It is a socially constructed way of specifying who the innocent are." (p. 58)
Prior scholarship, James Turner Johnson (p. 58):
Just war emphasis on noncombatancy grew out of
1. Canon law tradition of the church—"persons who do not make war...should not have war against them."
2. Medieval chivalry code of the knights—"those having military prowess agree not to exercise their power against others weaker than themselves."
~ Johnson critiques Ransey's just war argument, says it obscures the existing struggle of protecting noncombatants.
"Noncombatant immunity may begin with concerns about the 'categorical prohibition of murder' or the love command. But such concerns only become specific following a long and arduous process involving the interests of religious, political, legal, and military institutions." (p. 59)
"The Islamic tradition on jus in bello restraints, like its Western counterpart, reflects a cultural consensus on the conduct of war: a consensus that owes much to moral principles and theological concerns but is also indebted to political and military factors." (p. 59)
"List of persons with immunity" compiled from various hadiths based on Muhammad's own war experiences (p. 59).
"The phenomenon of devotion to the Prophet Muhammad, and the sense that all Muslim behavior should be systematically, consistently scrutinized in terms of the guidance of God, must be seen as a primary motivation for the development of classical Sunni thinking on war( and on other matters)." (p. 60)
~ This is Kelsay's basis on Sunni thought, though not his only basis.
Presupposed interpretation of the Qur'an:
"A scholar such as al-Shaybani thus presupposed the connection of Islam with an imperial state and its power—specifically, the power of the Abbasid caliphate, by whom he (as others) was appointed as chief qadi or religious judge." (p. 60)
~ So alongside historical and scriptural bases is the interpretative aspect of forming a worldview.
Yet another worldview influence: engagement in military practice.
~ Unlike the other two, this one is a view formed practically and experientially. Which begs the question: which has more authority? The pronouncement of authority, derived theoretically (and historically, since Muhammad's own experience in historical accounts ought not be dismissed), or one's personal experience in matters not explicitly laid out in text or oral traditions?
"Fred Donner has suggested that a number of practices, including notions of who may or may not be killed in war, were adopted into Islam from the pre-Islamic culture of Arabia or from the conquered regions." (p. 60)
Random note: I notice Kelsay always define an Arabic term (XXX, or YYY). What does this say about his audience? The book is definitely academic in genre, but perhaps it's meant for fields other than religious or Islamic study, in which scholars are expected to have a working knowledge of Arabic.
fard kifaya: collective obligation
fard ayn: individual obligation
"And thus the territory of Islam—really, the world—could not be a secure place until and unless Islamic hegemony was acknowledged everywhere. To secure such hegemony was the goal of the jihad, or 'struggle in the path of God.'" (p. 61)
~ This is Kelsay's definition of the term jihad. (Note other scholars' definitions and compare/contrast.)
Ibn Rushd (Averroes) on the damage of an enemy (p. 62):
1. Property
2. Person (life and limb)
3. Liberty
"Ir does not seem to me that the Sunni theorists actually articulate a notion of noncombatant immunity, as just war thinkers understand it." (p. 66)
~ Conclusion drawn after looking into who was immune: men, women, children, Muslim women, Muslim children; battlefield vs. after capture (al-Shaybani's discussion).
In the West:
"...specification in terms of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants—deciding, in a sense, to assign innocence or guilt according to the roles people play." (p. 66)
"Classical Sunni theorists dealt with this question in a different way. For them, guilt and innocence had to do with religious and political factors." (p. 66)
"The rules governing the fighting of rebels thus continue to demonstrate the qualification of moral concerns for discrimination in war by religious, political, and military considerations." (p. 69)
~ Kelsay cites Ali's (the fourth caliph) saying about not killing rebels after the rebellion is over. Treatment is different because people involved in the fighting are different: one is not fighting an unbeliever, but another Muslim who had gone against established authority (within Islamic territory).
Contemporary:
"Unlike the classical theorists, contemporary Muslim thinkers seem mostly interested in the jus ad bellum."
~ Rather than the jus in bellum.
jus ad bellum or jus contra bellum: law on the use of force or law on the prevention of war
Consider this phrase:
"When, in 1924, the 'Young Turks' abolished the Ottoman Caliphate, they did away with one of the most important institutions of classical Islam.... The Turkish abolition of the institution signified the decision of an elite to institute radical reform: in effect, to depart from the classical patterns of Islamic culture and to develop new ways of ordering life." (p. 69)
Kelsay's claim, from his observation of Turkish secularization:
"...Muslims who have been doing the most thinking about the conduct of war have not been doing so as self-conscious developers of the tradition of Islamic thought." (p. 69)
~ His example to back up this claim: the PLO, whose claims are based more on Arab nationalism than on Islamic traditions.
"To struggle against this enemy [Israel, Zionism, world imperialism], by whatever means one can muster, is just. Correspondingly, those who support the enemy or who stand idly by incur guilt and become, in some sense, legitimate targets of military force." (p. 70)
~ So this is a new definition of just war. The concept is still to accomplish one's goal through force, but how, and by what means, are different. This is more a "guilty by association" mentality, more seeing people as blocs regardless of age and participation in war.
"In more Islamic materials, two types of writing have been predominant in modern discussions of jihad: one is apologetic and seeks to indicate to the world that Islam is not a 'religion of the sword.' The other is revolutionary and seeks to indicate the justice of Islamic struggle against imperialism." (p. 71)
~ Group 1: Mahmud Shaltut's The Koran and Fighting, all justified war is defensive; Kelsay finds his reason for jus in bellum lacking. Group 2: "Creed of Sadat's Assassins," Egyptian tract, fighting necessary to pursue Islamic state, no in-betweens; also lacking attention to jus in bellum, attention all towards jus ad bellum.
Consider:
"It is typical of much twentieth-century Islamic thought that it is not involved with considerations of statecraft.... Islamic thought has been either in the position of providing legitimacy...[or] a language of resistance." (p. 74)
"In this interpretation, the shelling [of Basra, Feb., 1984] would symbolize a growing conviction that the Iraqi people must be held responsible for their continued support of Saddam Hussein." (p. 75)
~ Kelsay parallels Iran's action as resembling jus in bello, where mass attack did not happen until after degrees of guilt was separated (mass responsibility for all Iraqis in the end not withstanding).
In accordance with Western just war ideas (p. 76):
~ Just vs. unjust
~ Innocent vs. guilty
~ Different levels of blame (and thus difference treatment)
Specification of justice: religious, political, military. These factors contribute to differences in the development of jus in bello between western and Islamic cultures.
"...students of ethics ought never to underestimate the importance of a real engagement with statecraft, including military strategy, for the formulation of a developed teaching on the conduct of war." (p. 76)
~ Note Kelsay's audience: students of ethics, not necessary Islamic study students.
